Finding assurance
Exact source identity and fail-closed replay on all 557 findings in the latest bundled scan, visible 1V–4V provenance, assumptions recorded where a finding is held for a human, and every human decision durably attributed.
Layer comparison · Q² Assure and competitor material reviewed 20 August 2026
Know what each security layer can prove.
Static source analysis, dependency review, dynamic testing, and runtime blocking answer different questions. If you have to defend the truth of a source finding, that is the question Q² Assure answers — and its current detection breadth is narrower than mature AppSec suites.
Executive comparison summary
Coverage and integrations
Q² Assure now ships governed source registration, multi-surface scanning, evidence replay, PQC readiness, reporting, remediation, GitHub assurance, DAST, and optional model assistance across 76 permission-mapped routes. Mature suites still document broader language, IDE, registry, and live-application coverage.
Live application defense
DAST tests a running application. WAAP/WAF products such as Indusface AppTrana can also block live traffic. Assure runs dynamic tests only against explicitly authorized targets under a recorded rules-of-engagement record, and does not block traffic at all.
The 2026 agentic field · primary contenders
The two strongest new contenders solve a different problem.
Claude Mythos 5 is Anthropic’s restricted frontier cyber model. Codex Security is OpenAI’s application-security agent. Q² Assure is a deterministic security evidence system with optional model assistance. This is a comparison of publicly documented product behavior—not a symmetric accuracy benchmark and not a claim that an undocumented control is absent.
| Decision dimension | Q² Assure | Claude Mythos 5 ↗ | OpenAI Codex Security ↗ |
|---|---|---|---|
| What it is | Evidence system Deterministic scanners, replay, validation, human decisions, reports, and governed remediation in one tenant-scoped ledger. |
Frontier cyber model Anthropic’s most capable model for cybersecurity and biology research, available through a restricted trusted-access program. |
Application-security agent A repository agent that builds project context, searches for vulnerabilities, validates findings, and proposes patches. |
| Discovery depth | Deterministic SAST, SCA, secrets, IaC, container, PQC, and authorized DAST families; narrower language and whole-program depth than frontier agents and mature suites. |
Vendor-reported frontier capability Anthropic reports advanced zero-day discovery and exploitation performance through Project Glasswing; access and workflow remain partner-restricted. |
System-context reasoning Creates an editable threat model, reasons over repository context, and prioritizes findings by expected real-world impact. |
| Exploit validation | Independent deterministic replay and challenge; authorized DAST is bounded by rules of engagement. It does not claim general autonomous exploit generation. |
Strong cyber task capability is vendor-reported; the public Mythos product page does not define a customer-visible per-finding validation contract. |
Sandbox pressure testing Where possible, validates potential issues in sandboxed or project-tailored environments and can produce working proofs of concept. |
| Immutable source proof | Locally demonstrated Frozen snapshot, manifest, file and evidence hashes, exact lines and bytes, secure source viewer, and fail-closed replay before a claim can advance. |
Not publicly specified No reviewed Anthropic source establishes a customer-visible byte/hash replay ledger comparable to Q² Assure. |
Not publicly specified OpenAI documents validated findings and visible analysis, but not an immutable line/byte/hash replay contract comparable to Q² Assure. |
| Authority and disagreement | Visible 1V–4V ladder Finder, replay, independent challenge, and attributable human decision remain distinct. Model output cannot confirm, refute, or suppress a finding. |
Not publicly specified The model and partner program do not publish an equivalent staged finding-authority ledger. |
Automated validation and user feedback are documented; an equivalent four-stage authority model is not publicly specified. |
| Uncertainty record | First-class Assumptions, counter-evidence, replay state, needs-human status, suppression rationale, and durable history remain visible instead of being collapsed into one confidence score. |
Not publicly specified | Threat-model edits and reviewer feedback are documented; the reviewed source does not specify Q²-style counter-evidence and suppression-history records. |
| PQC migration | Shipped · demonstrated Scan-scoped asymmetric key-generation, classical-signing, and key-exchange findings mapped to CWE-327 with hybrid migration guidance. |
No product-specific claim reviewed | No product-specific claim reviewed |
| Patch workflow | Governed proposal, preview, approval, independent verification, and rollback history. Model drafting is narrow and advisory; no automatic repository write. |
No product workflow specified Mythos is a model and trusted-access program, not a publicly documented end-to-end remediation product. |
Context-aware fixes Proposes fixes aligned with system intent and surrounding behavior, designed for easy human review and acceptance. |
| Operating boundary | Offline-first Required truth path works without model credentials or source egress; optional providers are tenant-configured and advisory. |
Trusted-access cloud model; Anthropic states 30-day retention for safety monitoring. |
Codex web research preview for eligible ChatGPT plans; repository context and optional validation environments power the agent. |
| Availability | Live proof of concept The demonstrated build is available at qcon.bwtr.ai; this does not claim independent production certification. |
Restricted Small set of vetted partners; pricing begins at the vendor-published token rates. |
Research preview Rolling out through Codex web to eligible ChatGPT Pro, Enterprise, Business, and Edu customers. |
Sources reviewed 20 August 2026: Anthropic Mythos 5, Anthropic cyber capability assessment, and OpenAI Codex Security. “Not publicly specified” means exactly that; it is not evidence of absence.
Part 01 · plain-language map
Eight layers, eight different questions.
A check in one column does not compensate for a gap in another. The useful question is not “which product has more checks?” but “which evidence and attack surface do we need?”
Language and family scope
JavaScript/TypeScript remains Assure’s most mature analysis surface (AST-based). Python, Go, Java, and C# now have interprocedural semantic engines — a within-module call graph and taint-to-sink analysis, not single-line heuristics — with narrower depth than the JS/TS path. A module is the set of same-language files in a directory; analysis does not follow imports across directories. SCA, IaC, container, and DAST analysis families are also implemented; see the coverage table below for what each currently covers and does not.
| Layer | Question it answers | What it inspects | Strong at | Cannot prove alone |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SASTStatic application security testing | Could this source or compiled code contain a vulnerability? | Code without exercising the running application | Dataflow, injection, unsafe APIs, and code patterns early in development | That the path is reachable in production or exploitable through the deployed configuration |
| SCASoftware composition analysis | Do third-party components introduce known risk? | Dependency manifests, lockfiles, package graphs, advisories, and licenses | Known vulnerable packages, transitive dependencies, license policy, and SBOMs | First-party business-logic flaws or whether a vulnerable dependency path is reachable |
| Secret scanningCredential discovery | Does stored text appear to contain credential material? | Source, configuration, history, and sometimes collaboration surfaces | Tokens, private keys, passwords, provider signatures, and high-entropy candidates | Whether a credential is live without an authorized provider check, or whether authorization logic is sound |
| IaCInfrastructure as code | Would declared cloud infrastructure be insecure? | Terraform, Kubernetes, CloudFormation, and related configuration | Public exposure, excessive privilege, weak encryption, and unsafe defaults before deployment | Whether deployed infrastructure drifted from source or is being actively attacked |
| ContainersImage and workload analysis | Does a built image or workload configuration carry risk? | Image layers, operating-system packages, application packages, and runtime configuration | Vulnerable base images, package CVEs, embedded secrets, root execution, and image policy | Application business logic or live exploitability at the public edge |
| DASTDynamic application security testing | Can a running application be made to behave insecurely from the outside? | Live HTTP, browser, and API requests and responses, usually without source visibility | Runtime behavior, deployed configuration, authentication flows, and externally reachable flaws | The exact source root cause for every result or code paths the scanner cannot reach |
| WAAP/WAFRuntime enforcement | Can malicious live traffic be detected or blocked now? | Production web and API traffic at the edge | Attack blocking, API protection, bots, DDoS controls, and virtual patches | That vulnerable source has been corrected; protection can reduce exposure without removing the flaw |
| Finding assuranceQ² Assure’s core layer | Does this specific source finding survive independent inspection? | Immutable source identity, cited bytes and lines, detector output, validators, counter-evidence, and decisions | Evidence lineage, replay, uncertainty, reviewer accountability, and durable truth history | Broad language coverage, dependency risk, live exploitability, or runtime blocking by itself |
Definitions follow the practical distinction described by OWASP’s testing guidance ↗: SAST examines code without running it; DAST sends requests to a running application and observes responses.
Part 02 · current product coverage
Coverage across the application security stack.
This table compares published product scope, not detection accuracy. Assure entries are locally demonstrated; competitor entries are vendor-advertised and linked below.
Evidence highlight
Green identifies documented current scope for a specific capability. It may identify Assure or a competitor in different dimensions. It is not a symmetric hands-on benchmark or a conclusion that one product is better.
What “locally demonstrated” covers, and what it does not
The latest bundled scan exercises TypeScript SAST, npm dependency matching, provider-pattern secret detection, Terraform and Kubernetes policy, Dockerfile analysis, and all three post-quantum readiness surfaces. It contains 557 findings and 557 replay-matched evidence records. JavaScript and the Python, Go, Java, and C# engines, PyPI/Maven/Go dependency ecosystems, CloudFormation, and authorized DAST are implemented and tested but are not all exercised by that single corpus.
Documented capability highlight
Current capability
Authorization-gated or bounded
Not provided
| Platform | Finding assurance | SAST | SCA | Secrets | IaC | Containers | DAST | PQC readiness | WAAP/WAF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q² AssureCurrent product build |
Locally demonstrated
Replay 557/557, 1V–4V lineage, assumptions on held findings, attributed decisions |
Shipped
Mature JavaScript/TypeScript AST engine; interprocedural semantic engines for Python, Go, Java, and C#; bounded cross-module depth is disclosed |
Shipped
Sealed, hash-verified offline advisory snapshot across npm, PyPI, Maven, and Go, with license-policy classification. Not a live continuously updated feed. |
Shipped
Ten provider signature patterns — AWS, GitHub, Slack, Stripe, Google, npm, and PEM private-key headers — across the working tree, with matched values redacted and fingerprinted in every output. Offline history scanning and CI prevention and fingerprinted. Offline history support is implemented; live-validity checks remain deliberately authorization-gated. |
Shipped
Terraform, Kubernetes, and CloudFormation policy packs, including cross-resource correlation rules; not a full CSPM |
Shipped
A seven-rule Dockerfile policy pack analyzed inside the same snapshot as your source. Sealed-inventory CVE matching and the deny-by-default registry-pull gate both exist as libraries with no caller outside their own package, so no scan reaches a registry at all. |
Shipped · authorization gated
Runs only against explicitly authorized targets under a recorded rules-of-engagement record — allowlisted hosts, safe methods, a request budget, an expiry, and a kill switch — with non-loopback targets refused unless a live grant is set. Results persist as first-class filterable findings. Not exercised in the bundled static corpus; broad live-target coverage is outside the demonstrated scope. |
Shipped · demonstrated
Three JavaScript/TypeScript detectors cover asymmetric key generation, classical signing, and key exchange. Findings are scan-scoped, replay-backed, CWE-327 mapped, and carry hybrid migration guidance. |
Not provided
Runtime-partner ingestion is governed and audited; Q² Assure does not block traffic or operate a WAF. |
| Claude Mythos 5Official source ↗ | Agentic cyber research; Q² finding-authority controls not publicly specified | Frontier cyber model Anthropic reports advanced vulnerability discovery and exploitation capability through vetted partners. |
No product-specific claim reviewed | No product-specific claim reviewed | No product-specific claim reviewed | No product-specific claim reviewed | Cyber research / pentesting Project Glasswing partners use the model to scan code; exact customer workflow is restricted. |
No product-specific claim reviewed | No product-specific claim reviewed |
| OpenAI Codex SecurityOfficial source ↗ | Agentic validation Editable threat model, impact prioritization, sandbox pressure-testing, reviewer feedback, and contextual patches. |
Repository-wide reasoning Continuously analyzes repository context and commit changes; not described as traditional static program analysis. |
No traditional SCA claim reviewed | No dedicated secret-scanning claim reviewed | No dedicated IaC claim reviewed | No dedicated container claim reviewed | Sandbox validation Can validate findings in a tailored running environment and produce working proofs of concept. |
No product-specific claim reviewed | No compared claim |
| GitHub Advanced SecurityOfficial source ↗ | Alert workflow; Assure controls not established |
Broad
CodeQL language set |
Yes |
Advertised prevention scope
Push protection, validity checks, and public monitoring |
Not established | Not primary | No compared claim | No compared claim | No compared claim |
| SemgrepOfficial source ↗ | Triage workflow; Assure controls not established |
Advertised rule breadth
35+ languages advertised |
Advertised reachability
Supply-chain reachability advertised |
Yes | Rule and configuration dependent | Not primary | No compared claim | No compared claim | No compared claim |
| SnykOfficial source ↗ | Issue workflow; Assure controls not established |
Broad
Multi-language code analysis |
Advertised developer SCA
Dependencies, licenses, and fix workflows |
Not established here | Advertised IaC scope | Advertised container scope | No compared claim | No compared claim | No compared claim |
| Checkmarx OneOfficial source ↗ | Triage/remediation; Assure controls not established | Core | Core | Yes | Yes |
Advertised container suite
Image, registry, policy, and runtime correlation |
Advertised suite DAST
Web/API testing integrated with AppSec results |
No compared claim | No compared claim |
| VeracodeOfficial source ↗ | Policy/mitigation; Assure controls not established |
Advertised enterprise breadth
Broad language, framework, and binary coverage |
Core | Not established here | Not established here | Not established here | Advertised enterprise DAST | No compared claim | No compared claim |
| SonarQubeOfficial source ↗ | Hotspot review; Assure controls not established | Core | Yes | Yes | Yes | No compared claim | No compared claim | No compared claim | No compared claim |
| Indusface AppTranaOfficial source ↗ | Managed validation; source assurance not primary | No compared claim | No compared claim | No compared claim | No compared claim | No compared claim |
Advertised managed DAST
Continuous expert-validated web and API testing |
No compared claim |
Advertised WAAP scope
WAF, API/AI protection, DDoS, bots, and managed response |
Model-assisted remediation, as each vendor documents it.
Assure now ships a model integration, so this axis belongs here. Every competitor cell below is that vendor's own published description, linked. Most of them generate fixes across far more languages and finding classes than Assure does — Assure drafts for one. The column worth reading is the last one: what checks a drafted fix before a person sees it.
| Platform | What the vendor documents | What checks it before a human sees it |
|---|---|---|
| Q² AssureLocally demonstrated |
Drafts a one-line fix for hardcoded-credential findings only, and explains a decided finding. Every other finding class is refused. No model can reach a verdict, and nothing applies a patch. |
A signal independent of the rule
The drafted line is re-checked by a signal that is not the rule that raised the finding — the cited credential material is either gone from the artifact or it is not. Fail it and the line is withheld rather than shown with a caveat. |
| Claude Mythos 5 |
Anthropic documents a highly capable cybersecurity research model used by vetted Project Glasswing partners to discover vulnerabilities. It does not publish Mythos as an end-to-end patch-review product. |
A customer-visible patch-verification contract is not publicly specified. Access is restricted and safety-monitored with a published 30-day retention requirement. Source ↗ |
| OpenAI Codex Security |
Builds an editable project threat model, prioritizes and validates issues, and proposes fixes that account for system intent and surrounding behavior. |
Pressure-tests findings in sandboxed or project-tailored environments where possible, then presents contextual patches for human review. The public material does not specify Q²-style independent rule-disjoint fix validation. Source ↗ |
| GitHub Advanced Security |
Copilot Autofix proposes a code change plus a natural-language explanation for CodeQL alerts, presented for developer review. |
Documents its own limits: suggestions “may fail to remediate the underlying vulnerability or introduce new vulnerabilities”, and may vary between attempts on the same alert. Source ↗ |
| Snyk |
Agent Fix (formerly DeepCode AI Fix) generates single-file fixes using LLMs prompted with a database of expert-written fixes. |
Documents “agentic retries”: a fix that fails a Snyk Code scan is fed back to the model and regenerated — the check is the scanner that raised the finding. Source ↗ |
| Semgrep |
Assistant auto-triages findings, explains them, and produces suggested fixes and autofix pull requests for review. |
Publishes a triage accuracy figure — “over 95% accurate in categorizing Semgrep Code findings as false positives” — and notes triage and suggested fixes may not run on every issue in a large scan. Source ↗ |
| Veracode |
Veracode Fix returns up to five AI-generated patches per flaw via retrieval over Veracode's own remediation data, for the developer to apply. |
Recommends the developer test the code before committing, and notes some flaw categories need further manual steps. Source ↗ |
| Checkmarx One |
Attackability-based triage classifies findings by reachability and exploitability, and the platform produces review-ready suggested fixes and remediation pull requests. |
States that “nothing automatically merges; developers remain accountable for final changes”, and publishes an outcome rate — “65%+ fixed first attempt” — rather than a verification step. Source ↗ |
| SonarQube |
AI CodeFix sends the affected code and issue description to an LLM and proposes an edit, for a subset of rules across eight languages. |
Documented as a proposed edit the developer reviews and opens in their IDE; the published material describes no separate verification pass. Source ↗ |
| Indusface AppTrana |
A different shape of remediation: SwyftComply applies AI-generated, expert-validated protections at the WAF layer rather than proposing a source change. |
Documented as expert-validated before it is applied, and explicitly a stopgap — the vendor describes developers writing the permanent code fix. Source ↗ |
Part 03 · trustworthiness of each result
Detection is not the same as proving a finding.
This table is where Assure is different, and it is the one to read closely. “Not established” means the reviewed official source did not substantiate the exact capability. It is not proof that the capability is absent.
| Platform | Immutable source identity | Independent exact replay | Validator lineage | Counter-evidence and uncertainty | Durable review history |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Q² AssureLocally demonstrated |
Locally demonstrated
Snapshot, revision, manifest, file hash |
Locally demonstrated
Path, line, byte, file, and snippet hashes; fail closed on drift |
Locally demonstrated
Finder plus distinct 2V, 3V, and human 4V actors |
Locally demonstrated
Unresolved assumptions and needs-human state on 14 findings; the counter-evidence field is implemented and empty on all 557 in the latest scan |
Locally demonstrated
Disposition, suppression, restoration, and audit append history |
| Claude Mythos 5 | Customer-visible immutable source identity not publicly specified | Customer-visible exact byte/hash replay not publicly specified | Equivalent staged finding-authority lineage not publicly specified | Equivalent first-class uncertainty record not publicly specified | Partner research workflow advertised; equivalent finding history not publicly specified |
| OpenAI Codex Security | Repository and editable threat-model context advertised | Sandbox validation advertised; exact byte/hash replay not publicly specified | Automated validation and feedback advertised; equivalent 1V–4V lineage not publicly specified | Threat-model edits and feedback advertised; equivalent counter-evidence record not publicly specified | Finding filters, feedback, and patch review advertised |
| GitHub Advanced Security | Repository and commit-oriented alerts advertised | Assure-equivalent control not established | Assure-equivalent staged lineage not established | Assure-equivalent first-class model not established | Native alert and remediation workflow advertised |
| Semgrep | Repository/managed scan workflow advertised | Assure-equivalent control not established | AI triage advertised; staged actor lineage not established | Triage and recommendations advertised; equivalent persisted model not established | Pull-request and managed-scan workflow advertised |
| Snyk | Repository, IDE, and CI issue context advertised | Assure-equivalent control not established | Assure-equivalent staged lineage not established | Assure-equivalent first-class model not established | Issue-management workflow advertised |
| Checkmarx One | Application scan context advertised | Assure-equivalent control not established | AI triage/remediation advertised; equivalent lineage not established | Assure-equivalent first-class model not established | Enterprise policy workflow advertised; equivalent append history not established |
| Veracode | Application/version scan workflow advertised | Assure-equivalent control not established | Automated and expert services advertised; equivalent lineage not established | Mitigation workflow advertised; equivalent evidence model not established | Policy, analytics, and mitigation workflow advertised |
| SonarQube | Branch and analysis context advertised | Assure-equivalent control not established | Hotspot review advertised; equivalent staged lineage not established | Review workflow advertised; equivalent persisted model not established | Quality-gate and hotspot workflow advertised |
| Indusface AppTrana | Outside primary live-testing layer | Continuous rescanning differs from source/hash replay | Managed expert validation advertised; equivalent source lineage not established | False-positive handling advertised; equivalent source model not established | Audit-ready remediation reporting advertised |
Part 04 · operational maturity
The gaps that must stay visible.
Q² Assure is a deployed product build with deliberately bounded capabilities. These are product gaps, not wording problems.
Assure’s demonstrated strengths
- Immutable, content-derived source snapshots
- Exact line, byte, file-hash, and snippet-hash citations
- Independent fail-closed evidence replay
- Visible finder, validator, truth-review, and human-review boundaries
- First-class prerequisites on every finding in the latest bundled scan, with unresolved assumptions on the 14 held for a human
- Durable suppression, restoration, disposition, and audit history
- Offline-first static review that does not execute repository code
Assure’s material current gaps
- Language, framework, and rule coverage still narrower than mature suites (JS/TS mature; Python/Go/Java/C# now have semantic engines, not yet whole-program analysis)
- SCA advisory data is a sealed offline snapshot, not a live continuously updated feed
- IaC/container policy packs exist but are not a full CSPM; no scan pulls from a registry at all
- IDE, live pull-request/CI/CD, and ticketing integrations (a fixture-driven GitHub webhook → check-run path exists offline, not a live GitHub App)
- Production identity and fleet operations. SAML, SCIM, MFA, service accounts, and a full SaaS trust plane are not implemented; hosted Google OIDC and per-tenant isolation are enforced at the API and storage layers, and that is where identity stops.
- Remediation stops at an approved proposal: an approved fix never becomes a branch or a pull request, because no code path in the product writes to a repository, so landing it stays a manual step outside Assure. Campaigns, SLAs, risk acceptance, compliance evidence, and control-effectiveness reporting are not implemented.
- Dynamic testing is limited to authorized synthetic targets; broad live-target coverage and external attack-surface discovery remain gaps
- WAAP/WAF enforcement, DDoS, bots, API discovery, and managed response (a signed/audited partner webhook contract exists; no owned edge enforcement)
Part 05 · honest decision
Complement first. Replace only when evidence supports it.
Assure should not currently be presented as a wholesale replacement for GitHub Advanced Security, Semgrep, Snyk, Checkmarx, Veracode, SonarQube, or Indusface AppTrana.
- Use broad AppSec toolsfor language, dependency, infrastructure, container, IDE, CI, and policy coverage.
- Use Q² Assurewhere a supported source finding needs exact evidence, adversarial validation, uncertainty accounting, and a defensible decision record.
- Use DASTto test what an outside actor can reach in the deployed application.
- Use WAAP/WAFwhen live traffic must be monitored or blocked while source remediation proceeds.
Defensible position
What you can rely on today is finding assurance: that core is differentiated and it is credible. What stands between it and a complete commercial platform is breadth, integration, and production operations — the three gaps where the market is ahead — and none of that work may be paid for with the rigor the core depends on.
Method and sources
Claims with boundaries.
Assure claims come from local tests and artifacts. Competitor claims summarize official public product material reviewed on 20 August 2026; they are not hands-on verification.
Claude Mythos 5Restricted frontier cybersecurity model, availability, retention, and pricing
Anthropic Mythos assessmentVendor-reported cyber capability and Project Glasswing context
OpenAI Codex SecurityThreat modeling, validation, patching, scale, and research-preview availability
OWASPSAST and DAST distinction
GitHub securityCode, dependency, secret, and prevention workflows
GitHub secret scanningValidity checks and public monitoring
SemgrepSAST, supply chain, secrets, and language breadth
SnykCode, dependencies, infrastructure, containers, and workflows
Snyk supported languagesPer-language Snyk Code and Snyk Open Source coverage
Checkmarx OneUnified AppSec scanners, APIs, risk, and integrations
VeracodeStatic-analysis language and platform breadth
Veracode DASTEnterprise-mode web application and API scanning
SonarQubeSAST, SCA, secrets, IaC, and SBOM scope
Indusface AppTranaDAST and WAAP runtime scope
“Not established” means the reviewed official source did not substantiate the exact capability. It is not proof that the capability is absent. No shared-corpus competitor benchmark, product purchase evaluation, or global comparative winner is presented. Green highlighting identifies documented scope for that capability; it is not a winner designation and must be revised when evidence changes.
Q² Assure capabilities audited against the current registry, routes, tests, and bundled scan 20 August 2026 · competitor material reviewed 20 August 2026
Return to the demonstrated product
Inspect the evidence, then judge the claim.
Every Assure cell above is traceable to package source, and every cell marked locally demonstrated is traceable to the published demonstration corpus. Every competitor entry summarizes that vendor’s own published material, cited in Method and sources and not hands-on benchmarked.